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NOT “BY ALL MEANS NECESSARY”: A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK 
FOR POST-9/11 APPROACHES TO COUNTERTERRORISM
Amos N. Guiora*
Counterterrorism significantly benefits from a comparativist approach. 
Precisely because no one country has the monopoly on effective operational 
measures, nation states significantly benefit from analyzing measures ap-
plied by other states confronting similar dilemmas and challenges subject to 
the role of law. To that end, this article examines the policies of targeted 
killing and administrative detention as applied in Israel and asks whether 
and how they are applicable to American counterterrorism. In asking this 
question, it is important to determine whether the two policies are relevant 
to the U.S. legal framework. An important consideration is how the differ-
ences between Israeli and American societies, geographies, constitutions, 
and strategies condition the counterterrorism policy of each country.  As a 
result of such differences, what works in one country may not work in 
another. While I am an unequivocal advocate for comparative research and 
analysis and have sought to bring this approach to my scholarship, I am 
fully aware of its limitations. That said, I firmly believe that nation states 
can and must learn from each other. While judicial, constitutional, and so-
cietal paradigms are unique and distinct, like-minded civil, democratic 
states must undertake the critical effort to understand how similar countries 
address similar issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Obama Administration faces the difficult challenge of develop-
ing operational counterterrorism models while confronting determined foes 
on multiple fronts. Doing so requires the Administration to balance the legi-
timate rights of the individual with the equally legitimate national security 
rights of the state. In particular, the Obama Administration faces two critical 
questions (with which the Bush Administration similarly—and unsuccess-
fully—struggled): (1) creating and implementing a legal and effective de-
tention paradigm for post 9/11 detainees; and (2) articulating the conditions 
for authorizing a targeting killing. This article will examine both policies—
detention and targeted killing—using a comparative approach. 
* Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, the University of Utah; I would like to 
thank Lena Cetvei (J.D. expected 2011, S.J. Quinney College of Law, the University of 
Utah) for invaluable editorial assistance. 
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Specifically, I will examine both policies through the lens of the 
Israeli experience. This is not to suggest that the Israeli approach is correct 
or foolproof. Rather, when treading in these difficult waters, it is important 
to recognize that learning from others is essential to developing a lawful and 
effective counterterrorism policy. In addition, I will address—and propose 
the pursuit of—active judicial review in an effort to ensure checks and bal-
ances and separation of powers. Justice Jackson’s words regarding an unfet-
tered executive ring as loudly today as they did fifty years ago.1
Section II will focus on administrative detention—both options for 
future models and lessons from the Israeli experience. In section III, I offer 
brief comments on targeted killing. Section IV will address the importance 
of judicial review in the framework of administrative detention and counter-
terrorism and section V will offer a perspective on comparativism.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
This discussion addresses current detainees and those who will be 
detained in the days and years ahead. My fundamental assumption is that 
the U.S. must replace the existing post 9/11 detention model—frankly, “in-
definite detention”—with a paradigm consistent with U.S. constitutional 
protections and habeas corpus guarantees as the Supreme Court in Boume-
diene v. Bush2 and Judge Bates3
To do so, the Obama Administration must examine and ultimately 
resolve several fundamental issues regarding detainees arrested since 9/11 
and presently held in Guantánamo Bay, Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and else-
where by or on behalf of the U.S.:
have articulated.
(1) Will the post 9/11 paradigm be defined as a traditional criminal 
law or war paradigm or as a hybrid combining aspects of both? 
(2) What are the criteria for determining whether a specific detainee 
poses a particular threat to U.S national security?
(3) What are the standards for judicial review for detainees deemed to 
pose a threat, after the establishment of a criteria-based vetting 
process? 
(4) Are all detainees prosecutable or will some be held in an alternate 
detention paradigm?
(5) Will released detainees be freed to their country of citizenship, in 
the U.S. or to some third country, and how will this be determined?
1 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson,      
J., concurring). 
2 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). 
3 See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208–09 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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For detainees arrested and held in the future, I advocate a model 
based on the criminal law system but modified to reflect the differences 
between terrorism and what is understood to be the traditional criminal law 
paradigm. In a nutshell, I define terrorism as actions seeking to advance a 
cause (religious, social, political, or economic) by killing or injuring inno-
cent civilians or intimidating the civilian population from conducting its 
normal activities with no pecuniary benefit accrued to the terrorist. In addi-
tion, as I have suggested elsewhere, prosecuting accused terrorists often 
requires the introduction of classified intelligence information.4 For this 
reason, I have previously proposed a hybrid model as an alternative judicial 
paradigm, often called a national security court.5
With respect to detention, I propose adoption of a two-tiered model. 
If the arrest is based on criminal evidence, detention prior to trial in the tra-
ditional criminal law paradigm is appropriate. If, however, the arrest is 
based on classified intelligence information regarding involvement in terror-
ist acts, administrative detention should be appropriate. My recommenda-
tion for the adoption of an administrative detention model in the U.S. is 
based on the following considerations:
(1) A determination that a detainee presents a specific threat to na-
tional security; 
(2) An assessment of the reliability and credibility of the intelligence 
information;
(3) Active and independent judicial review;
(4) Source protection subject to independent judicial review, a legiti-
mate consideration in when intelligence information suggests that the 
prospective detainee is involved in future acts of terrorism.
The process and considerations of applying administrative detention 
on specific individuals has developed over the course of many years in 
Israel.6 The measure is applied in the West Bank by order of the military 
commander (Israel has never annexed the West Bank) and in Israel by the 
Minister of Defense.7
4 Amos N. Guiora, Military Commissions and National Security Courts After Guantána-
mo, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 199, 202–03 (2008).
In both, the decision is subject to judicial review: in 
the West Bank by two military courts and the Israeli Supreme Court, and in 
Israel by the Tel Aviv District Court and by the Israeli Supreme Court.
5 See id. at 204–05.
6 Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative Detention 
in Israel: Does a Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips? 18
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 721, 752–61 (2001).
7 See British Government, The Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1442 PALESTINE 
GAZETTE 1055 (Sept. 27, 1945).
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The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice 
(HCJ), held administrative detention to be lawful in accordance with Clause 
85 of the Defense Emergency Regulation Act of 1945, provided that the 
available intelligence information indicates that the individual in question is 
involved in a future act of terrorism. Furthermore, the evidence must meet a 
six part test of reliability, credibility, validity, viability, time-relevance, and 
the inability to be presented in open court because of the over-arching re-
quirement to protect an intelligence source. An order for administrative de-
tention is subject to three layers of judicial review: first, a hearing before a 
military judge, akin to an administrative hearing; second, an appeal before a 
senior military judge; and finally a hearing before the Israeli Supreme Court 
(sitting as the HCJ). According to the Defense Emergency Regulation Act, 
an order may authorize detention for a maximum period of six months, with 
the opportunity to renew for an additional six months. Although an order 
may be renewed an unlimited number of times, each renewal order requires 
the same three-step judicial process.
The fundamental premise of the administrative detention model is 
the individual’s involvement in a future act. That involvement must present 
a sufficiently real—not just perceived—threat to national security in order 
to justify a process in which neither the individual nor counsel see the clas-
sified information;8 judicial hearings are held in camera/ex parte.9
(1) The quality of the intelligence and the reliability of the source;
Human 
rights organizations have been extremely critical of the denial of the right to 
confront one’s accuser. However, the HCJ has upheld the denial of this right 
as lawful and necessary in the context of national security, based on a dem-
onstration that the commander (who signs the order) has weighed, balanced, 
and considered the following:
(2) The possibility that the intelligence cannot be declassified (which 
would enable initiation of the criminal law process);
(3) The threat the individual poses to national security;
(4) The appropriate length of detention in proportion to the threat 
posed;
(5) For renewal of orders based on information that justified the ini-
tial order, as opposed to new information, the continuing severity and 
nature of the threat, among other factors.
In practice, when the Israel Security Agency (ISA) receives intelli-
gence information suggesting a specific individual’s involvement in terror-
ism, there are several options “on the table”: arrest for the purpose of inter-
8 See CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel [2008] 20–22 (Isr.), translation avail-
able at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf.
9 Id.
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rogation and trial, administrative detention, or monitoring and surveillance 
without detention.
If the ISA recommends administrative detention, the military com-
mander will ask his legal advisor to review the intelligence information in 
order to advise whether to adopt the recommendation. In my postings as 
senior security advisor to the West Bank Legal Advisor (1990–1992) and 
Gaza Strip Legal Advisor (1994–1997), I regularly reviewed ISA recom-
mendations to military commanders regarding Palestinian residents of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. My recommendations were either to accept the 
ISA’s detention recommendation, including the length of the detention, or 
to reject the ISA’s recommendation and advise the commander either to not 
detain the individual or to arrest him and initiate a criminal law process. 
In each case, I based my recommendations to the commander on the 
following specific considerations:
(1) Quality of intelligence and source reliability (this required an ex-
pert opinion from an ISA official);
(2) Timeliness of the intelligence information (this required an expert 
opinion from an ISA case agent);
(3) An individual’s previous activities (this required review of the ISA 
intelligence dossier);
(4) Impact of detention on the individual’s immediate community;
which is particularly relevant if the individual was a highly regarded 
or a respected leader (this required an expert opinion from an ISA 
official);
(5) NGO response to the particular detention (Israeli and international 
human rights organizations were unanimous in their criticism of the 
administrative detention measure; in addition, we faced additional 
sensitivity with respect to certain categories including women, 
“people of prominence,” and attorneys);
(6) Severity of the danger the individual posed (this required an expert 
opinion from an ISA official);
(7) Possibility for declassification of the intelligence information and 
for the interrogation of the individual, thus enabling initiation of the 
criminal law process;
(8) Danger to the source were the information to be declassified (this 
required an expert opinion from an ISA official);
(9) Likelihood that the Israel Supreme Court (sitting as the HCJ)
would intervene in the commander’s decision.
If I affirmed the ISA’s recommendation, the intelligence dossier 
and my recommendations went to the commander. If the commander ac-
cepted my recommendation, the individual would be detained in accordance 
with the signed order, which included a short description of the order’s jus-
tification, largely a general statement regarding the individual’s activity. As 
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I shall discuss later, these orders are subject to judicial review by the mili-
tary court and Israel Supreme Court.10
Administrative detention is “necessary and vital” for national secu-
rity. However, the legal, moral, and policy dilemmas pose significant ques-
tions that demand attention. Two fundamental realities are particularly 
troublesome. First, the detainee cannot confront his accuser and therefore 
fails to enjoy a fundamental right guaranteed in the criminal law paradigm. 
Second, the individual is detained—predicated on intelligence information 
exclusively—prior to carrying out what is believed to be a future act of ter-
rorism. Balancing these two realities is essential to the lawful implementa-
tion of an administrative detention measure; by its very nature the adminis-
trative detention places the individual at an extraordinary disadvantage. 
When I was asked to review a file—whether as legal advisor or judge—the 
dilemma was the same: is the measure truly necessary or is there another 
available mechanism that balances the legitimate rights of the individual 
with the equally legitimate rights of the state? While the preferred answer—
provided I was convinced of the danger posed by the individual—was to 
initiate the criminal law process, operational counterterrorism’s reliance on 
intelligence information often forecloses this option. In a nutshell, protect-
ing the source is of the fundamental essence, because otherwise the state 
cannot gather the intelligence information that is the heart and soul of op-
erational counterterrorism.
That said, it is important to recall the criteria for applying adminis-
trative detention: individuals who were involved to varying degrees in plan-
ning future acts of terrorism or had indicated their intention to commit fu-
ture acts. In planning with others, the individual—by analogy—was en-
gaged in a conspiracy; for example, by indicating to others an intention to 
throw Molotov cocktails the next time a Israel Defense Force (IDF) patrol 
passed through his village, the individual clearly expressed an intent to 
commit a crime. Administrative detention is preventive detention. In this 
situation, the ISA would recommend administratively detaining the individ-
ual. My decision (and this is critical to the discussion) would be based—in 
large part—on the two factors addressed earlier: reliability and relevance of 
the intelligence information and whether the information could be 
declassified. 
By analogy, if terrorism depends on resources and motivation, then 
counterterrorism depends on intelligence information based on sources. My 
dilemma, then, was whether the severity of the planned action justified de-
nying the individual his day in court in order to protect the source. As a 
lawyer trained to respect the principle of enabling the accused to confront 
his accuser, I consistently grappled with that issue. In many ways the di-
10 See infra Part IV.
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lemma is “lose-lose”; the denial of otherwise-guaranteed privileges and 
protections raises fundamental legal and moral questions regarding society 
and the limits to which it will go to protect itself. I have, throughout my 
career, recoiled at phrases such as “by all means necessary.” I have always 
believed that a seat at the counterterrorism table, which I had, brings with it 
the requirement of understanding the limits of power. That is, one must be 
extraordinarily sensitive to both the rule of law and the dangers inherent in 
the slippery slope—as exemplified by government excess not subject to 
independent judicial review.
As the legal advisor tasked with recommending to the commander 
whether and for how long to administratively detain a Palestinian resident of 
either the West Bank or Gaza Strip, I viewed it as my responsibility to be a 
buffer between competing interests. On the one hand, the security agency 
had very specific interests that generally aligned with the commander’s; on 
the other hand, the potential detainee had rights and freedom that were also 
deserving of protection. While the courts (both military and Israeli Supreme 
Court sitting as the HCJ) exercised independent review of each detention 
order, both with respect to necessity and length of detention, I endeavored 
to minimize the cases in which the HCJ would intervene in the command-
er’s decision. To that end, my responsibility was to review the intelligence 
information carefully to ensure that only cases in which administrative de-
tention was required were brought before the commander. The two step 
process—(1) whether to detain; and (2) if yes, for what period of time—
required the balancing of powerful and competing interests.
I have repeatedly argued that the most difficult part of the process 
was determining what detention period to recommend to the commander. I 
found this decision more difficult than sentencing a defendant represented 
by counsel, precisely because the detainee did not have the right to confront 
his accuser. It would be fair to state that determinations regarding how 
many months in detention were appropriate for a given individual represent 
some of my most difficult internal struggles. While a mathematical formula 
does not exist, I used the principles of proportionality and necessity as a 
guide to balancing equally legitimate rights, coupled with the understand-
ing, frankly, that the process is inherently problematic because the detainee 
cannot confront his accuser.
I have advocated elsewhere for the creation of an alternative judi-
cial paradigm for bringing post 9/11 detainees to trial.11
11 See Guiora, supra note 4.
That same court 
would also be the most appropriate forum for administrative detention. The 
alternative paradigm is fundamentally predicated on the understanding that 
terrorist trials often require the introduction of classified information. This 
would be particularly true should the U.S. decide to bring detainees held for 
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a number of years in Guantánamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and Bagram to trial. 
Both trials of suspected terrorists and administrative detention hearings in-
volve review of intelligence information. I would therefore suggest that the 
proposed alternative judicial model is appropriate for both paradigms. Crit-
ics have, correctly, identified the fundamental flaw in the proposal: the al-
ternative paradigm denies the individual the right to confront some or all of 
his accusers.12
That criticism is both valid and correct. However, the unfortunate 
reality of operational counterterrorism is a reliance on classified intelligence 
information. An alternative judicial paradigm (whether trial or administra-
tive detention) seeks to strike a balance by guaranteeing process through 
judicial review rather than allowing detention by executive fiat not subject 
to independent judicial review. The latter model is clearly unconstitutional 
and has, in large part, been struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court.13
III. TARGETED KILLINGS
The 
question going forward is what process should the Obama Administration 
establish for the thousands of detainees presently held? I would suggest that 
the proposed administrative detention model in conjunction with the alterna-
tive judicial model reflects a balanced approach in an extraordinarily com-
plicated and complex paradigm.
Israel’s policies on administrative detention and judicial review 
provide useful frameworks for assessing options for a U.S. model. In light 
of the recent revelations regarding CIA plans to conduct secret targeted kil-
lings of al-Qaeda operatives, Israel’s targeted killing policy may prove help-
ful.  As I suggested in a Foreign Policy article, License to Kill, these revela-
tions are sure to set off a renewed debate in the U.S. over the legality, utili-
ty, and morality of killing terrorists.14
Targeted killings are indeed legal, under certain conditions. The decision 
to use targeted killing of terrorists is based on an expansive articulation of 
the concept of pre-emptive self-defense, intelligence information, and an 
analysis regarding policy effectiveness. According to Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, a nation state can respond to an armed attack. Targeted kill-
ing, however, is somewhat different because the state acts before the attack 
occurs. In addition to self-defense principles, the four critical principles of 
In the article, I wrote: 
12 See, e.g., Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: 
Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 593, 643 
(2009).
13 See, e.g., Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 
(1942); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
14 Amos N. Guiora, License to Kill, FOREIGN POL’Y, July 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/13/licence_to_kill?page=full.
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international law—alternatives, military necessity, proportionality, and 
collateral damage—are critical to the decision-maker’s analysis.
The basis for the attack is intelligence information that meets a four-part 
test: Is it reliable, credible, valid, and viable? Given the stakes, corrobo-
rated information is significantly preferable to information that comes 
from a single source.
Israel instituted its targeted killing policy in large part in response to Pales-
tinian suicide-bombing attacks. But it’s not just the bombers themselves 
that are a threat. Four actors—the bomber, the planner, the driver/logistics 
person, and the financier—form the basis of the suicide bombing infra-
structure. Determining which of the four is a legitimate target, and when, 
is the critical question decision-makers face. As not all four are legitimate 
targets at all times, the commander is limited against whom he can act; 
that reality reflects the limits of self-defense. 
This rearticulation of expansive self-defense is insufficient on its own, 
however, because the decision to authorize the “hit” is not made in a va-
cuum. Implementing the four international law principles referenced above 
requires the commander to ascertain that the “hit” is essential to national 
security and therefore proportional to the risk the individual presents. Fur-
thermore, the commander must determine that any alternatives, such as 
capturing and detaining the individual, are not operationally possible. The 
commander must also seek to minimize the collateral damage—harm to 
innocent civilians—that is all but inevitable in such attacks. 
When asked by a particular commander to authorize a targeted killing, I 
would ask the following factual questions:  
a. Who is the source?
b. How reliable is the source?
c. How timely is the information?
d. What is the relationship between the source and the potential 
target?
e. How precise is the information? (I was once told, for example, 
“he is wearing a blue shirt and blue jeans,” but it was nighttime and 
the commander had night-vision equipment)
f. When was the last time the unit conducted a nighttime ambush?
g. How confident was the commander in his unit’s capabilities?
h. Did the commander receive the intelligence directly from the in-
telligence community and had he discussed the issue with a case 
officer?
Although I have advocated the effectiveness of targeted killings from an 
operational counterterrorism perspective and supported its legality as an 
expansive articulation of self-defense, in the case of the blue jeans I did 
not authorize the requested attack. The information about the individual 
unequivocally indicated that the danger posed to Israeli national security 
was palpable. I was also convinced that detaining him was operationally 
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unfeasible. However—and this is the core of the issue—I was not con-
vinced that the individual in the commander’s scope was the right man.
Aggressive operational counterterrorism is lawful, but that is not enough. 
It must also be effective and moral. Understanding and implementing the 
limits of power is an essential aspect of aggressive self-defense; uncertain-
ty is a fact of life in the counterterrorism business. Precisely for that rea-
son, the four pillars of counterterrorism must include the applicable law, 
but also morality, policy effectiveness, and careful and cautious operation-
al decisions.
Targeted killings decisions are among the most complicated and complex 
aspects of operational counterterrorism. The decision-maker literally faces 
an overwhelming amount of information. Before authorizing and firing, 
the commander must ascertain who the target is; otherwise, the policy is il-
legal, ineffective, and immoral. But if you’re sure you’ve got the right guy, 
and you have no other viable options, fire away. The nation’s safety may 
depend on it. 15
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Once any counterterrorism policy or operation is implemented, 
judicial review becomes paramount. After all, the limits of power are essen-
tial to the rule of law. While, perhaps, this is an obvious motto or slogan, its 
application in times of crisis is no mean feat.  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s deci-
sion to intern Japanese-Americans in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Korematsu v. United States 16 are clear exam-
ples of what I define as panic responses. The Palmer Raids, Prize Cases and 
the Presidential Order establishing the Military Commissions are similar 
examples.17 What is disheartening in all four is that while the executive 
engaged in excess, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court engaged or 
challenged the President. Checks and balances fell by the wayside; Justice 
Jackson’s famous warning of an unfettered executive18
As the three branches of government move into the post-Bush era, 
they would do well to recall not only Justice Jackson’s words but also those 
of the former President (Chief Justice) of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon 
Barak: “‘Security considerations’ are not magic words.”
went unheeded.
19
15 Id.
These two articu-
16 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
17 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); Military Order of November 13, 2001: 
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3
C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV 2004).
18 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
19 Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Terrorism, in JUDGMENTS OF THE 
ISRAEL SUPREME COURT: FIGHTING TERRORISM WITHIN THE LAW 19 (2005).
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lations of the same concept are essential to understanding how judicial re-
view is critical to the implementation of counterterrorism policies.
The fundamental requirements for such policies, including adminis-
trative detention and targeted killings, are caution and skepticism; caution 
by the executive and skepticism by Congress and the courts. Both are essen-
tial to the rule of law and ensuring that “by all means necessary” will be 
relegated to Hollywood rather than adopted by the Administration as a via-
ble counterterrorism policy. As a direct participant in decision-making in 
the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack, I know it is easier said than 
done. The decision-maker is truly put to the test: the public and media are 
clamoring for a response and politicians in opposition parties demand action 
to assure voters that if they were in office either the attack would not have 
occurred or their response would be so powerful and effective as to literally 
guarantee no future attacks. Precisely because of these pressures, the Su-
preme Court must engage in active judicial review.
The administrative detention paradigm, with its inherent prejudice 
against the detainee, requires rigorous judicial review, perhaps more than 
other operational counterterrorism measures. When recommending to com-
manders whether to administratively detain Palestinians, I considered the 
HCJ’s future review of the recommendation to be a critical component of 
my decision-making process. After all, the court would often ask why a 
particular recommendation was made and would intervene if it was not con-
vinced that the decision met a reasonableness standard. While reasonable-
ness may seem broad, it was sufficiently contoured to provide decision-
makers guidelines regarding the range of what measures could be imple-
mented. Active judicial review of administrative detention orders means 
that the court is consistently examining whether the executive correctly ap-
plies the reasonableness test to operational decisions. That is, the review is 
not vague; rather, it is concrete because the court wants to be satisfied that 
the executive understands that reasonableness is not an abstract concept, but 
rather has clear parameters and judicially imposed limits.
In Israel, judicial review is used not only to check the actions of 
commanders in implementing administrative detention against an individu-
al, but at all levels of executive power. For example, in my recent article in 
the Jurist, Judicial Review and the Executive: Lessons from Israel,20 I ad-
dressed a case in which the HCJ held that the IDF’s Judge Advocate Gener-
al’s Corps decision to not order a court martial for a commander was not 
reasonable.21
20 Amos Guiora, Judicial Review and the Executive: Lessons from Israel, JURIST, July 13, 
2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/07/judicial-review-and-executive-lessons.php.
In that article I wrote:
21 Abu Rahma v. Judge Advocate General 08/7195 [2004] (Isr.).
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The executive, regardless of rank and post, is not immune from 
judicial review. Deference does not benefit the state or the individual 
petitioner. If the Israeli Supreme Court had taken the track of 
judicial deference, in all probability the JAG’s decision would have been 
upheld, thereby minimizing the gravity of the commander’s 
decision. Only by directly engaging the executive in active strict scrutiny 
could the Court hold that the JAG had fundamentally erred.
Nothing is more dangerous to a democracy than an “unfettered executive”.  
Justice Jackson was both prescient and correct in Youngstown Sheet and 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.  His concern was also timeless. This principle must be 
applied across the board.  Encouraging judicial review of some executive 
branches but not others will do no more than ensure unequal justice 
under law. The JAG’s decision must be subject to review in the same 
vein as that of any other executive decision maker. The essence of active 
judicial review is to protect the unprotected and to ensure that the 
executive acts within reasonable boundaries as broadly defined.
By ruling that the JAG did not act within these boundaries, the Court is 
sending a loud and clear message: the executive is subject to strict judicial 
review and it cannot hide behind the cloak of executive decision making. 
That powerful and compelling message should be adopted by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, particularly when striking a balance between the legitimate 
rights of the individual and the equally legitimate national security rights 
of the State. The free pass that the Supreme Court has historically granted 
the executive in national security cases (Korematsu v. United States being 
the poster child) has, in the long-run, harmed the individual and the state 
alike.22
In his book, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in War Time,23
the Late Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated that “reticence” should be the 
Supreme Court’s role in times of armed conflict; in contrast, Barak’s model 
was a fundamental lack of deference to the executive (IDF).24
22 Guiora, supra note 20.
Although IDF 
commanders felt the HCJ intervened in their natural bailiwick, Barak was 
convinced of the need to ensure that operational counterterrorism measures 
were reasonable. The only way to do so was to engage the executive 
through judicial review, because without it judicial deference would create 
an inevitable disregard for the rule of law. 
23 See WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 225
(1998).
24 See Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, Going Toe to Toe: President Barak’s and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s Theories of Judicial Activism, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51,
54–56 (2006).
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V. COMPARATIVISM IN PERSPECTIVE
In determining if and how the various Israeli policies of administra-
tive detention, targeted killings, and judicial review can be useful in creating 
the U.S. legal framework, an important consideration is how the differences 
between Israeli and American societies, geographies, constitutions, and 
strategies condition the counterterrorism policy of each country.  As a result 
of such differences, what works in one country may not work in another.25
While I am an unequivocal advocate for comparative research and 
analysis and have sought to bring this approach to my scholarship, I am 
fully aware of its limitations. That said, I firmly believe that nation states 
can and must learn from each other. While judicial, constitutional, and so-
cietal paradigms are unique and distinct, like-minded civil, democratic 
states must undertake the critical effort to understand how similar countries 
address similar issues. In the field of counterterrorism (like others), no sin-
gle nation state has “all the answers,” making learning from others essential.
Under former President (Chief Justice) Meir Shamgar, and particu-
larly under former President (Chief Justice) Aharon Barak, the Israeli Su-
preme Court was the nation’s dominant institution, matched—perhaps—
only by the IDF. Barak’s extraordinarily broad definition of standing and 
justiciability meant that literally every alleged grievance committed by the 
State (including future proposed action) was petitionable to the Court sitting 
as the HCJ. As discussed above, beginning in the nineteen nineties, military 
commanders were increasingly forced to take into consideration the Court’s 
real-time intervention. The dilemma of the decision-maker—complicated 
enough in operational counterterrorism without external intervention—was 
indeed made more complicated precisely because the Court imposed its 
“reasonableness” test on commanders.26
I have advocated in my scholarship the absolute importance of ac-
tive judicial review.
The burden was on the commander 
to show that a particular operational decision met that test; if not, the Court 
would not hesitate to rule that the commander’s decision violated the rights 
of the petitioner.
27
25 Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the Risks of the C.I.A.’s Covert Drone 
Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer?currentPage=all#Replay.
The basis for this deeply held belief is the seat that I 
had at the counterterrorism table. That is, I have been a direct participant 
(not witness) to extraordinarily complicated dilemmas and understand the 
tension between excess of power and limits of power. That tension and the 
26 See supra Part IV.
27 See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Creating a Domestic Terror Court, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 617 
(2009); Amos N. Guiora, Interrogation of Detainees: Extending a Hand or a Boot? 41 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 375 (2008).
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need to respond justify active judicial review. The legislative branches in 
any country, including the U.S. and Israel—as historically documented—are 
either incapable of or unwilling to restrain the executive. Therefore, the only 
operational response to Justice Jackson’s unfettered executive concern is an 
active, interventionist Court.
However, the Israeli paradigm is not a mirror image of the Ameri-
can paradigm. Barak’s theory of an unlimited scope of judicial review 
stands in direct contrast to the “cases and controversies” clause of Article III 
of the U.S. Constitution.28 As a result of Chief Justice Marshall’s decision 
in Marbury v. Madison,29
Is this system translatable into the U.S. paradigm? According to 
Marbury and a narrow reading of “cases and controversies,” the majority of 
scholars would suggest it is not. On the other hand, the historical U.S. over-
reaction to perceived or actual threats suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court 
(in the absence of a Congress that genuinely engages in “checks and bal-
ances”) could adopt a fundamentally different approach than it has histori-
cally. Perhaps Boumediene
the Supreme Court became an equal partner in the 
government. In the Israeli paradigm according to Barak’s theory, I suggest 
that the Court (particularly when sitting as the HCJ) is first among equals. 
30 and Hamlily31 are a sign of things to come; 
needless to say, I fully agree with Judge John Bates and only hope that fu-
ture decisions will reflect his holding.32
It is clear that there are fundamental differences between Israel and 
America—size and immediacy of the threat are but prime examples. How-
ever, precisely because both are vibrant democracies the principles of 
checks and balances and separation of powers must be more than empty 
platitudes. They are what protect us from executive excess in both cultures. 
The role of the Court is to constantly and unblinkingly engage the execu-
tive. Whether Barak’s theory is too interventionist is a matter of lively aca-
demic debate; while I would suggest it was a proper response in reining in 
the executive, I well understand those who are critical. On the other hand, 
former Chief Justice Rehnquist’s theory regarding the role of the Court in 
times of armed conflict is, I respectfully suggest, deeply flawed and ulti-
mately harmful to U.S. principles and values.
The ultimate role, I believe, of a “comparativist” is to examine dif-
ferent regimes—recognizing that profound differences exist—with the in-
tention of identifying strengths from distinct paradigms and cobbling to-
28 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
29 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
30 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
31 See Hamlily v. Obama, No. 05-0763, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43249, 34 (D.D.C. May 
19, 2009).
32 See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208–09 (D.D.C. 2009).
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gether a functional model for addressing similar issues. With respect to 
counterterrorism, the Israeli model (albeit problematic as I have argued) is 
adaptable in the U.S., if based on legislation and subject to active judicial 
review.
